"After reading Tough's book I am convinced of the discrepancies between the non-cognitive skills of the advantaged and disadvantaged and I am convinced that they are, at a minimum, partially malleable. Therefore, with an egalitarian end in mind, character-education seems like a no brainer. Reading the objections of Morton, however, I agree with the need to maintain diversity. Yet, I take issue with the premise that any cultural norm or end that could reasonably be considered good is worth preserving for the sake of diversity. I contend that the only cultural discrepancies worth preserving are ones that would exist under a just society. That is, if a cultural view would exist in a community had it not been stricken by poverty (which I contend is unjust) and it can be reasonably assumed to be good then it is valued for the sake of diversity. If collectivism is a function of a societal group because of necessity (i.e. the poor rely on each other to survive) it is not valued for diversity because a just society would not have such diversity (assuming that is the only reason for collectivism--which is likely not the case). It wouldn't be just to encourage or sanction a lower-class child to a certain trait simply by the virtue of them being of the lower-class. Doing so would distribute traits according to the already unjust distribution of society. Adding this second criterion only slightly minimizes Morton's importance of diversity but may expand the character traits which can be taught.
The culture of poverty, that is, many of the socio-cultural issues that Paul Tough details (eg. parental absenteeism, single-parent families, parental detachment) exist due to poverty. Therefore, there is nothing wrong with influencing these values or the traits that may also go along with them. In extension of this idea is that there is nothing wrong with equalizing the frequency of certain character traits within children of all classes because under justice those classes shouldn't exist (this I am taking for granted). That is not to say there may not be an individual or personal objection to character education. It may be wrong to change someone's character traits if he or she would retain such traits regardless of his or her circumstance. This, however, does not seem to be a problem for Morton because her concern lies specifically with diversity, that is the frequency of traits not the specific or personal level of changing the path of one's character.
The correct course of action, it seems, would be to implement character education as justice would allow. That is, we should seek education that best brings about equality of opportunity, ignoring objections to character education so long as the education is consistent with the two criteria: 1) the ends could reasonably be considered good, and 2) they do not remove diversity that would exist under justice. The second criterion should naturally follow as a matter of policy because character education is already targeted at the discrepancies in character between the advantaged and the disadvantaged.
There is one remaining problem. In creating universal systems of character education we would be reducing diversity that would exist under justice. Assuming characteristic x is frequent in poor communities, removing characteristic x from everyone in that community also removes the characteristic from those who would have retained it regardless of their SES. Even if this is just a small amount of people it would seem inconsistent with a liberal society’s value of diversity. I don't believe that the small reduction in diversity that would exist under justice should outweigh the value of equality. It seems unlikely that the reduction in diversity would be so great as to outweigh equality. The diversity changes would be limited to traits such as grit; it does not seem that a more uniformly gritty society would be horribly disadvantaged from a diversity view. For instance, a gritty person can pursue any number of ends which would maintain the most important aspects of diversity such as moral opinions on social issues, liberal or conservative politics, etc."
The culture of poverty, that is, many of the socio-cultural issues that Paul Tough details (eg. parental absenteeism, single-parent families, parental detachment) exist due to poverty. Therefore, there is nothing wrong with influencing these values or the traits that may also go along with them. In extension of this idea is that there is nothing wrong with equalizing the frequency of certain character traits within children of all classes because under justice those classes shouldn't exist (this I am taking for granted). That is not to say there may not be an individual or personal objection to character education. It may be wrong to change someone's character traits if he or she would retain such traits regardless of his or her circumstance. This, however, does not seem to be a problem for Morton because her concern lies specifically with diversity, that is the frequency of traits not the specific or personal level of changing the path of one's character.
The correct course of action, it seems, would be to implement character education as justice would allow. That is, we should seek education that best brings about equality of opportunity, ignoring objections to character education so long as the education is consistent with the two criteria: 1) the ends could reasonably be considered good, and 2) they do not remove diversity that would exist under justice. The second criterion should naturally follow as a matter of policy because character education is already targeted at the discrepancies in character between the advantaged and the disadvantaged.
There is one remaining problem. In creating universal systems of character education we would be reducing diversity that would exist under justice. Assuming characteristic x is frequent in poor communities, removing characteristic x from everyone in that community also removes the characteristic from those who would have retained it regardless of their SES. Even if this is just a small amount of people it would seem inconsistent with a liberal society’s value of diversity. I don't believe that the small reduction in diversity that would exist under justice should outweigh the value of equality. It seems unlikely that the reduction in diversity would be so great as to outweigh equality. The diversity changes would be limited to traits such as grit; it does not seem that a more uniformly gritty society would be horribly disadvantaged from a diversity view. For instance, a gritty person can pursue any number of ends which would maintain the most important aspects of diversity such as moral opinions on social issues, liberal or conservative politics, etc."